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法学家  2018, Issue (2): 32-44    DOI:
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共同善权利观的力度与限度
朱振,法学博士,吉林大学法学院/理论法学研究中心副教授,国家“2011计划”司法文明协同创新中心研究员。
The Strength and Limitation of Rights Based on Common Good
Zhu Zhen, Ph.D. in Law, Associate Professor of Jilin University Law School.
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摘要 拉兹的共同善权利观试图超越义务论与功利主义的对抗,从而为权利理论找到一条新路。根据共同善权利观,权利的重要性超过了权利人利益的重要性,权利可证成其他人对权利人的义务,但权利人的利益则无法做到这一点。这一权利观的最终目标是指出权利存在的价值在于它对共同善的贡献,共同善是决定权利存在的最重要的理由。但是,这一权利观并不能有意义地证成自由权的存在,既无法揭示权利人中心权利观的政治哲学意涵,也无法解释权利保护的严格性与权利行使的正确性之间存在的不匹配。更重要的是,自由权与共同善的关系是非常复杂的,不仅众多的共同善是相冲突的,而且共同善对权利也不是单向的、必然的支持关系。权利保护的严格性,并不来自抽象意义上的共同善,而是来自对相冲突的不同共同善的衡量。这一点为理解我国《民法总则》第185条中“公共利益”的涵义与功能提供了一个融贯的解释,而这一条规定也正好展现了共同善权利观的力度与限度。
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朱振
关键词共同善权利观   自由权   拉兹   公共利益   英烈人格利益     
Abstract: Raz's theory of rights based on common good tries to transcend the confrontation between Deontology and Utilitarianism so as to find a new way for the theory of rights. According to the view of rights from common good, the importance of rights is more important than the interests of the rightholder, and the rights can justify the duty of others to the rightholder, but the interests of the rightholder cannot do so. The ultimate aim of this view of rights is to point out that the value of the existence of right lies in its contribution to the common good, and the common good is the most important reason for the existence of the rights. But this theory of rights does not justify the existence of the rights of freedom availably, is unable to reveal the implications of political philosophy of rightholder-centred theories of rights, and cannot explain the mismatch between the correctness of the exercise of rights and the stringency of the protection of rights. More importantly, the relationship between the rights of freedom and the common good is very complicated.  Not only are a lot of common goods conflicting, but there is not a one-way and inevitable supportive relationship between the common good and rights. The stringency of the protection of rights does not come from the common good in the abstract, but from the balance of the different common goods in conflict. This provides a coherent explanation for understanding the meaning and function of “public interest”in the 185tharticle of General Rules of the Civil Law of the People's Republic of China, and this article just shows the strength and the limitation of the common good approach.
Key wordsRights   Common Good   Joseph Raz   Public Interest   Personality Right of Heroes and Martyrs   
引用本文:   
朱振. 共同善权利观的力度与限度[J]. 法学家, 2018, (2): 32-44.
ZHU Zhen. The Strength and Limitation of Rights Based on Common Good[J]. , 2018, 167(2): 32-44.
 
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